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"Guessing the Income Distribution Effects of Trade Liberalization 
and Labour Ref orm in Colombia 
1. Introduction 
Colombia emerged from the 1980s in a much better economic 
state than most other countries of the region. Present export and 
overall growth prospects are also favourable, given the oil/gas 
discoveries and the demonstrated export capacity in a range of 
other products. Trade liberalization, the major policy change in 
recent years, is also expected by its proponents to have a positive 
effect on growth. Related components of the market-oriented reforms 
have been privatization, financial market reform, and reform of 
labour legislation. 
This paper considers the possible labour market effects of the 
economic policy reforms of the last decade in Colombia, in 
particular the "apertura" or liberalization of trade which began 
(or accelerated, depending on how one looks at it) in the early 
1990s and the labour market reforms of the early 1990s. While our 
concern is with labour market outcomes in general, including 
unemployment, wage levels, quality of work, stability of work, 
etc., we focus on the distribution of income (especially labour 
income) as a key indicator of how well the economy is serving the 
interests of the majority of the population. A highly unequal dis- 
tribution of income means that the number of jobs paying somewhere 
close to the average income in the economy is low relative to the 
size of the labour force. Some people see in the "apertura", labour 
market and related reforms a serious threat to employment and in- 
come distribution. Comparable reform packages have been associated 
in several Latin American countries with dramatic increases in 
inequality, increases large enough to pose a serious threat to any 
country planning to undertake them. Another threat comes from the 
possible Dutch disease effects of strong export growth in the 
mineral sector. Few countries have experienced the benefits of 
major oil booms without accompanying problems and costs, one of the 
major fears being a worsening of income distribution. 
Effects of the policy reforms initiated in the first years of 
this decade may be expected to appear soon, while those of the 
gradual liberalization underway from the mid-1980s may already have 
been felt. Predictions as to their distribution impact have varied 
from the many who feel that freer markets increase inequality to 
those who believe that trade liberalization in particular should 
have the opposite effect, based on the simple Hecksher-Ohlin theory 
that the freeing of trade should shift factor demand in favour of 
unskilled labour and of agriculture and thereby improve the 
distribution of income (e.g. Krueger, 1990). The main reason for 
concern in Colombia, however, is not the predictions of the theory, 
1 
which are in any case ambiguous', but the empirical record from 
other countries: the experience of sharply higher inequality in 
Chile, Argentina and perhaps Uruguay, and a less dramatic increase 
in Mexico around the time of the broadly similar policy reforms 
undertaken in those countries. These experiences suggest that any 
optimistic expectations on the distribution front should be 
discarded; the important question is whether the impact will be 
negative and large; a neutral outcome should be cause for 
satisfaction. Clearly if both the mineral export boom2 and the 
liberalization cum related policy reforms were to have negative 
impacts on Colombia's income distribution, the combined effect 
might be quite severe. Hence the importance of assessing the 
possible dimensions of these threats and the ways in which they 
might be avoided or offset. 
1 Even the implications of the static Hecksher-Ohlin model 
become ambiguous as soon as a third factor (e.g. skilled labour) is 
allowed for. In any case, many other mechanisms could operate 
differently under a more open than a less open economy, so theory 
gives little or no overall guidance as to what sort of impacts are 
most likely. De Melo and Robinson (1980) used a CGE to provide 
evidence that in the light of Colombia's being a primary product 
exporter, in the medium term outward—oriented policies would be 
more detrimental to income distribution than would inward-looking 
ones. 
Meanwhile Lora and Steiner (1994) use a static CGE model to 
test for the effects of elements of the recent trade liberalization 
policy on Colombia's income distribution. Unfortunately the model 
has tracked a declining urban Gini when the real shift appears to 
have been in the other direction. 
2 Colombia has yet to confront the challenges associated 
with a major mineral export boom. Booth (1992, 327) notes that both 
neoclassical models (highlighting the dichotomy between traded and 
non—traded goods/services) and broader political economy ones 
suggest that the rural sector and the regions from which the 
traditional export items came will suffer and the urban middle 
class be the main beneficiary during an oil boom. Whether these 
effects would still show up in the middle or the long run (with the 
mineral sector still booming) would depend among other things on 
the responsiveness of migration to earnings differentials, and on 
whether public policy (e.g spending in the social sectors) was 
designed to counteract the direct impacts of the boom. The two 
models have quite different predictions for what will happen after 
the boom ends, the simplest neoclassical versions implying a 
reversal of the resource flows, though more complete analyses 
attempt to deal with possible irreversibilities. The political 
economy models highlight the attempt by the groups enriched by the 
boom to maintain their new (if it is new) status, income levels, 
etc. 
2 
It is interesting to consider whether the combined effects of 
policy reforms and a mineral export boom would tend to reinforce 
each other or to offset each other. In one respect the latter 
should be the case: while the boom lowers the relative price of 
other tradeables, the policy reforms (the trade reform, to be 
specific) have the opposite effect. At a more concrete level, one 
hope of the trade reform is to bring more labour intensive exports 
like clothing, leather goods, furniture and some agricultural 
products more firmly into the export sphere. But, with the easy 
"rents" which it implies, Cusiana brings the threat of Dutch- 
disease effects on such relatively labour intensive sectors. 
With respect to the labour market effects of the apertura and 
other policy reforms, the evidence to date from Colombia somewhat 
inconclusive; the hints it provides are mixed, and the period 
involved is in any case too short to provide definite answers. 
Though some industries have clearly been hurt by the import 
liberalization, urban unemployment has remained low by Colombian 
standards. Most important, however, there appears to have been a 
relatively sharp reversal of the previous equalizing trend in the 
urban distribution of income. Thus far the worsening appears to be 
less drastic than what happened in the 1970s/80s in Chile or 
Argentina, but if the negative trends apparent through early 1993 
(the most recent data we have been able to incorporate here) were 
to continue for a few more years the accumulated worsening would 
become comparable to those extreme cases.3 Even if the outcome is 
less dramatic, however, it does create challenges which will need 
to be met if the policy reforms are to make the positive impact 
their architects hope for. One is a much more effective educa- 
tion/training system, in particular one which quickly shrinks that 
low-skill tail of the labour force, which if we believe the 
unfolding patterns in other Latin American countries may suffer 
relative income losses from the trade opening. Another is the more 
effective integration of labour-intensive small and medium firms 
into successful exporting and import-competing activities. A better 
understanding of the potential challenges can be provided by a 
detailed look at the Chilean and Argentine experiences. 
2. The Danger of Replicating the Chilean or Argentine Experience 
Recent experience in Chile and Argentina (1970s and 1980s) 
provides worrisome examples of unprecedentedly sharp increases in 
inequality. Between 1974 and 1988 Argentine GNP grew by only 4%; at 
the heart of the crisis (1980-82) it fell by a dramatic 13%. 
Accompanying this medium—run macroeconomic failure was an unusually 
sharp increase in income inequality, the Gini coefficient among 
income earners in greater Buenos Aires rising from 0.365 (1974—75 
average) to 0.46 (1987-88 average). It is been plausibly argued 
There has been growing concern in Colombia that the new 
"model" is having an adverse effect on income distribution 
(Sarmiento, 1993). 
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that, given the prominence of wage goods among Argentina's exports, 
an increase in the real exchange rate (through devaluation, for 
example) would, ceteris paribus, lead to a decrease in the real 
wage rate and a worsening of the distribution of income. But it is 
also clear that the decade—plus worsening of the income distribu- 
tion cannot be fully explained by this link with the real exchange 
rate, since net worsening occurred between periods with the same 
real exchange rate (Berry et al, 1994a, Table 2.28). It is also 
possible that worsening was related to slow growth over the period 
as a whole as well as over short periods, consistent with the 
general proposition argued by Morley (1994). Changes in labour 
policy are another strong candidate; the bulk of the increase in 
inequality between the mid l970s and the late 1980s4 occurred 
between 1976 and 1978 (Berry et al, 1994b, Table 4.5), as the new 
military government fixed wages, repressed trade unions, eliminated 
collective bargaining and the right to strike, and reformed the 
labour code to the detriment of workers (Cortes and Marshall, 
1993). Structural changes wrought by the change in trade policy 
might also have worsened inequality; the "liberalization episode" 
of 1976-82 (during which imports skyrocketed in 1979 and 1980) led 
not only to a fall of 11% in manufacturing output but to a decline 
of employment in that sector by 37%, as output per worker rose by 
a striking 41% (Gelbard, 1990, 54). Many small and medium firms 
exited, while many large firms cut employment, increased capital 
stock and improved technology. 
Chile's experience is also of special interest; since 1973 the 
economy has undergone the most radical policy reforms of any nation 
in the region; unlike Argentina, these reforms were not 
subsequently reversed. The country has suffered two severe 
recessions; after each collapse growth resumed quickly and was 
strong, but average annual growth over 1970—92 was only 3.2%, 
despite an impressive 6% average since 1984. As of the late 1960s 
inequality was somewhat less severe than in most other Latin 
countries; data for greater Santiago indicate a marked improvement 
during the Allende administration, followed by a sharp reversal. 
The distribution of consumption among greater Santiago households 
suffered one of the largest deteriorations ever recorded 
statistically in a developing country, occurring primarily between 
1969 and 1978 but also over the decade which followed (Berry et al, 
1994a, Table 2.29b). It appears that most of the worsening occurred 
very quickly during the five years after Allende's fall, and 
especially during the recovery from the dramatic recession of 
A number of the policy steps taken by the Pinochet regime 
probably contributed to the accentuating inequality, including the 
When another discrete worsening seems to have occurred 
(Morley, 1994, 8) 
If the national trend in consumption distribution were like 
that of Santiago, the consumption decline in the bottom quintile of 
households over 1969-78 would have been 40%. 
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extensive privatization and the curtailment of agricultural credit 
to small farmers (leading to land concentration) and of preferen- 
tial financing to small entrepreneurs. Perhaps most important was 
the reform of the labour legislation, which relaxed worker dis- 
missal regulations, suspended unions (to 1979, when they were again 
authorized to operate, but with many restrictions), greatly reduced 
the social security tax paid by the employers and reduced other 
non-wage costs as well. Wealth and capital gains taxes were 
eliminated, profit tax rates substantially reduced, and public 
employment greatly cut back. Unemployment rates (for greater 
Santiago) rose to unprecedented levels in the neighbourhood of 20— 
25% (depending on the definition used). Only in 1989 did this rate 
fall below 10%; since then the fall has been continuous, to just 5% 
in 1992 (ECLAC, 1992, 42). According to Ffrench—Davis (1992, 15) 
average wages in 1989 were still 8% lower in 1970; as of 1992 they 
were probably marginally above the 1970 level, a very slow recovery 
indeed. The coverage of the minimum wage was restricted consider- 
ably and its level fell in the 1980s. 
One striking feature of the post-1973 period in Chile and an 
important aspect of the evolution of the labour market was a sharp 
increase in the relative income of persons with university and 
vocational secondary vis a vis those with less education, an 
increase which occurred mainly in periods of economic expansion 
(Robbins, 1994). This shift was clearly one proximate cause of the 
worsening in income distribution. Robbins' analysis indicates that 
it was not primarily the result of shifts in the composition of 
employment among industries, but rather a "within sector" phenom- 
enon. It may reflect a greater relative payoff to higher education 
under a more open economy. In Argentina wage differentials narrowed 
between 1980 and 1986, then widened sharply in the succeeding three 
years during which inequality jumped upwards (Morley, 1993, 92). In 
the downturn of 1988—89 the real wage decline was heavily concen- 
trated among those with the least education and in the least 
skilled jobs. 
Over Mexico's long period of rapid growth up to the debt 
crisis in the early 1980s it appears that most wages rose sub- 
stantially (Gregory, 1986) and that inequality either fell (as 
argued by Hernandez—Laos and Cordoba, 1982) or stayed about 
constant. Recent household surveys for 1984 and 1989 indicate a 
worsening of distribution over that period (the Gini coefficient of 
per capita household income rising from 0.49 to 0.52——see Alarcon, 
1993, 105), worrisome but probably less extreme than those of 
either Argentina or Chile. 
Colombia's experience over the 1970s—1980s appears to have 
been unique within the region, since a fair case can be made that 
income distribution showed some net improvement, while the country 
was also recording one of the few good growth records over that 
span. An important part of the story is the unusually marked 
decline in earnings differentials across educational levels and 
between genders, declines especially concentrated in the late 1970s 
while the economy was still growing rapidly and in the early 1980s 
when it was not (Tenjo, 1993). Rural earnings were also showing 
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considerable improvement at this time (Ministerio de Agricultura y 
Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 1990, 228). 
Differences in economic structure or in growth rates could be 
at the root of the contrast between Colombia's experience during 
the 1970s and 19805 and those of Argentina and Chile. If the 
contrast was due more to differences in policy, the intriguing 
hypothesis would be that Colombia's positive experience was due to 
the absence of major shifts in trade or labour market policy. 
Before looking in more detail at the distributional experience in 
Colombia, we review its macroeconomic performance over the last 
couple of decades. 
3. Economic Policy and Macroeconomic Performance Since the 1960s 
The path of the Colombian economy over the period since the 
late 1960s has reflected exogenous international events (prices, 
exports demand, evolution of the drug industry, etc), the country's 
resource base, and its economic policy. Our main concern in this 
paper is the extent to which the evolution of employment and income 
distribution has been affected by policies on trade/industrial 
policy, the exchange rate and the labour market. 
Since the late 1960s Colombia's macroeconomic performance has 
been among the best (or least bad) in Latin America. Over 1970-93 
average GDP growth was 4.4%, placing the country second only to 
Brazil at 5.1% (Berry et al, 1994b, Table 1). Growth was also the 
least unstable among major countries in the region, as the debt 
crisis and the accompanying recessions hit Colombia much less hard 
than most other countries. Growth in the early 1990s (through 1993) 
has been about average for the region, at a little over 3% per 
year. 
This creditable record dates from the late l960s and has been 
based on generally good exchange rate management since the switch 
to a flexible rate in 1967, a trade regime offering incentives both 
for import substitutes and for exports, and a relatively prudent 
fiscal and monetary policy, under which fiscal deficits never 
reached the unsustainable levels of several other countries of the 
region and monetary growth was accordingly more modest. The 
administration of Lleras Restrepo marked an important turning point 
for the economy. The 1967 trade and exchange rate reforms ushered 
in one of the most successful periods of industrial and export 
growth in Colombia's history, and put an end to a liberalization 
episode which had taken place since 1965 under severe pressures 
from the donor agencies (Diaz-Alejandro, 1976, Ch.7). The Lleras 
government refused to devalue and instead adopted the crawling peg, 
stringent import and exchange controls, and a stable export 
promotion policy (Ocampo, 1994, 136). This process was interrupted 
since the late l970s by the Dutch disease effects of the coffee and 
foreign indebtedness booms between 1975 and 1982, reflected in the 
real appreciation of the peso and a mini-episode of import 
liberalization around 1980. As industrial and overall growth 
slackened (hitting bottom in 1982-83 with little or no growth), 
export coefficients declined and structural change ceased. Since 
the mid-1980s there has been renewed growth in the industrial 
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sector, but the presumably falling returns from the ISI elements of 
the model and the acute change in the external conditions facing 
the country led to a radical turnabout in policy in 1990-91, and 
the adoption of a more explicitly outward-oriented strategy 
(Ocampo, 1994, 145). It is still too early to do more than guess at 
the growth effects of this strategy. 
Protectionism, though well embedded in policies since the 19th 
century, played a somewhat secondary role during the first phase of 
import substitution, while real exchange rate fluctuations provided 
the most important price signals to industrial entrepreneurs 
(Ocampo, 1994, 134). Ocampo sees the 1967 package as the 
consolidation and rationalization of the mixed strategy followed 
since the late 1950s. In 1969 the Andean Pact introduced ISI in a 
regional context, but dissatisfaction with it spread in the early 
1970s and most of its mechanisms proved inoperative. The Pastrana 
administration (1970-74) was not favourably disposed to ISI and 
placed more emphasis on export growth. Over the years a gradual 
import liberalization occurred. By the mid-1970s inflation was a 
serious threat; the Lopez government (1974-78) addressed it via 
tight monetary and fiscal policy, which however was reversed by the 
Turbay administration in favour of expansionary fiscal policy, 
tight monetary policy and import liberalization, leading to a 
consolidated public sector deficit of 7.1% by 1982 and massive 
public sector borrowing abroad. Real appreciation deepened in the 
early l980s debt boom and export promotion was downgraded, not as 
a result of an explicit decision but of short-term macroeconomic 
considerations. The deteriorating situation led the Betancur 
administration (1982—86) to rapidly reverse more than a decade of 
import liberalization. The average nominal tariff level was raised 
from 32% to 49% between 1982 and 1984, though the average collected 
tariff did not rise until 1985, and peaked at around 24% between 
1986-88 from the earlier level of around 15% (Table 1). As of 1991 
it was back down to 13.3%, a little below the l970s level. The 
tariff equivalent of the QRs rose quickly over 1982—85 from 11% to 
31%, though falling back quickly in the years to follow. The 
liberalization during the rest of the decade was moderate (Ocampo, 
1994) 
During the early 1980s, thus, the economy had become more 
closed; from a high of 22% in 1982 the constant (1975) price 
import/GDP ratio fell to 14.4% in 1984, then fluctuated in the 16- 
18% range through 1991 (Table 2). The comparable current price 
series declined and rose more smoothly. The time profile on the 
export side is similar; after the lows of 1982—83 of under 15% 
(constant prices) or 12.0 or less (current prices) the recovery 
brought the shares to around 19% over 1986-89. 
The two principal goals of policy in the 1980s were to 
overcome the dangerous fiscal deficit (which reached as high as 7% 
of GDP) and to overcome the balance of payments deficit which led 
to a rapid decline of reserves (Becerra et al, 1993, 106). From 
1986 on, except for the 2.1% in 1988) the deficit has been under 2% 
arid over 1990-92 it was essentially zero. The current account was 
balanced from 1986 on, and a surplus of 500M in 1990 gave a nice 
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cushion with which to begin the apertura. 
Industrial growth was unstable during the 1980s. Like the 
overall growth rate, it remained below the levels reached over 
1967-74; by the end of the 1980s, slowing growth and accelerating 
inflation was increasingly interpreted as the result of a struc- 
tural blockage based on two factors, stagnation in the growth of 
factor productivity and lack of dynamism in investment, frequently 
blamed in turn on the inward looking development model (Republica 
de Colombia, 1991, 7; Montenegro, 1991, cited by Lopez, 1994, 19). 
This contributed to a perception that trade policy required a 
radical change towards an explicitly outward oriented strategy, a 
perception that was consistent with a generally more market 
friendly ideology in Latin America at this time. 
The Gaviria administration (1990-94) came to power facing a 
difficult inflation challenge (to which the need to devalue in the 
previous years had contributed) committed to continuing and 
accelerating the already initiated process of liberalization, which 
was accompanied by a partial freeing of exchange controls, more 
open access to foreign investment and a liberalization of the 
labour market. The government was aware that distributional 
problems might result from the liberalization, a concern derived 
both from an understanding of the sorts of adjustments which would 
be involved in the process of "apertura" and related reforms, and 
from the experience of other countries of the region, Europe and 
elsewhere. 
The apertura was carried out quickly, though its effects on 
imports were delayed.6 While in December 1989, 38.8% of tariff 
positions were free, 60.1 required previous permission, and 1.1% 
were prohibited; by Nov. 1990 these numbers were 96.7, 3.3% and 0. 
The long postponed liberalization of intra-Andean Pact trade was 
accelerated and virtually completed by Jan. 1992, and the decision 
was made to put a customs union in place in 1992 with tariffs 
slightly lower than those adopted by Colombia in 1991 (Ocampo, 
1994, 145). The ratio of tariffs (including surcharges) collected 
to GD?, around 1.5% at the beginning of the decade, fell to 1.1% in 
1984, recovered to 1.7-1.9% over 1985—88 (when a CIF tax on imports 
was added to the customs and surtaxes), fell to 1.0% in 1992 but 
6 There has been some difference of opinion with respect to how 
fast Colombia's trade liberalization has taken in comparison with 
those of other countries of the region. Lora and Steiner (1994) 
conclude, as does Edwards (1994) that it has been fast. Edwards 
reports that the Chilean reform took about five years in the 1970s 
while that of Colombia took just one year after being initiated in 
1991. Others, like Sheahan (1994) view the Colombian liberalization 
as gradual, from back in the mid-1980s. Clearly the issue is partly 
one of whether one focuses on the tariff and QRs or on the size of 
trade flows. 
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then rose to 1.3% in 1993 as imports surged. The average tax7 on 
imports of goods and non—factor services ranged between 10 and 14% 
over most of the 1980s, and fell only in 1992 and 1993 to the 
neighbourhood of 5% (Table 1). Thus, though the import taxes did 
fall sharply in 1992, the decline is less than might be suggested 
by the data on tariff positions. 
The crawl of the peso was accelerated to prepare the ground 
for the liberalization and some external funding was arranged in 
expectation of an import surge. The import surge came much later 
than expected, and foreign exchange mounted to the equivalent of 18 
months of imports, from a normal 6 months or so. Contributing 
factors included the expectation by economic agents of further 
tariff reductions, leading them to delay imports, and the 
government's emphasis on curbing inflation, which led some people 
to expect a recession. The tight money policy pushed real interest 
rates quite high and since the government opened the ' apital market 
at an early stage of the apertura this helped to flood the economy 
with foreign exchange, rendering the monetary policy unsuccessful. 
With inflation accelerating and imports not growing, and believing 
that the main factor in this situation was the expectation of 
further tariff cuts, the government decided to accelerate the 
program, dropping rates in 1991 to the levels previously planned 
for 1994 (Becerra et al, 1993, 123). When even this did not raise 
imports quickly, the government felt forced to appreciate, even 
though one of the arguments which had been put forward for the 
speeded—up opening was to avoid a revaluation which would 
compromise the development of the export sector. At the beginning 
of 1992 the newly created Junta del Banco de la Republica decided 
to lower the anomalously high interest rate to a level consistent 
with the international market, and accept that the money supply 
would be a passive variable. 
Imports finally jumped in 1992 (by 30%) and surged in 1993 (by 
over 50%). The export quantum rose sharply in 1990 (mainly due to 
coffee), since which time growth has been moderate. The current 
price export/GDP ratio appears to have levelled off at around 20%. 
Growth, which had recovered to average 4.5% over 1985-90, fell 
to a low of under 2.5% in 1991, from which it has gradually 
accelerated to somewhere in the range 4—5% in 1993. The fixed 
investment ratio (current prices) was quite stable at 17-18% of GDP 
during the 1980s until it jumped in 1988 to 19.5%, since which it 
fell systematically to 14.2% in 1991, recovering to 15.5% in 1993. 
The constant price series moved in a similar way. We presume that 
there was an increase in 1993. 
The Changing Pattern of Trade 
The composition of exports has changed significantly since the 
early 1980s, when coffee accounted for about half of the total. 
Excluding the value added taxes applied also to domestic 
goods. 
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Since then its absolute dollar value has fallen while that of 
mining products rose sharply to about 2.2B of a total of 7.3 in 
1992, with coffee at just 1.3, other agriculture at and other at 
2.6B. Beginning in 1990 coffee accounted for less than 20% of the 
value of merchandise exports and in 1993 its share was down to 
under 16% and less than half of the value of mineral exports. 
Manufactures rose from about 7% of the total in 1970 to 31% in 1991 
(World Bank, 1993, 268). 
The main manufactured export sectors have been foods, textiles 
and chemicals (accounting for three quarters of such exports in the 
1980s). Three structural features seem to have been important. 
These exports are relatively natural resource and unskilled labour 
intensive (Thoumi, 1979; Villar, 1983). Exporting firms are 
relatively larger and more capital intensive than non—exporting 
firms in each sector (Echavarria and Perry, 1981; Villar, 1983). A 
few capital and human resource intensive firms have been successful 
in combining import substitution and important penetration of 
regional markets (Ocainpo, 1994, 155). These regional markets are 
dominant in the cases of chemicals and machinery (70% in 1990) 
while the natural resource based exports go mainly to developed 
countries. The 1980s and early 1990s may have seen some modifica- 
tion in these patterns, though the evidence is not yet conclusive: 
there has been some increase in more skill—intensive exports, and 
also an apparent increase in the share of exports coming from small 
and medium sized plants (Escandón and Berry, 1994). 
The fairly rapid quantum growth of exports in the last few 
years (about 8% per year since 1988) and the considerable changes 
in their composition would suggest that some Hecksher-Ohlin effects 
might show up. On the import side this is even more evident, with 
the slow growth over the late 1980s followed by the dramatic 
increases in 1992 and 1993. Consumer goods fell to under 10% of 
total imports by value in 1984—85, then gradually recovered to 
13.4% in 1992, while intermediate goods fluctuated in the range 50- 
60% of the total. The big surge of imports in 1992 and 1993 saw 
consumer goods rise especially fast (by 82.3% in 1993 alone) to 
reach 18% of the total. 
4. Trends in the Distribution of Income 
As noted above, it is fairly generally accepted that income 
inequality decreased in Colombia between the early 1970s and the 
early 1980s, both in urban areas and for the nation as a whole, and 
both for earners and for households. Londoflo's detailed study 
suggests a decline in the Gini coefficient between 1971 and 1978, 
from 0.53 to 0.48, with essentially no change from then until 1988, 
for which his estimate is 0.475 (Londoño, 1989). Though some 
ambiguity remains as to the trends in the 1970s due to data 
problems, our main concern here is with the period beginning in the 
late 1970s, during which the economy went through a brief period of 
liberalization (early 1980s), then a sharp reduction in openness 
followed by a gradual re-opening through the rest of the 1980s and 
the abrupt apertura of the early 1990s. Labour market reforms 
10 
occurred mainly around 1990, though union power was clearly 
weakened by the recession of the early 1980s. 
Our estimates of income distribution in three of Colombia's 
largest four cities (Bogota, Medellin and Barranquilla) reveal a 
quite significant and continuous8 decline in inequality between 
1976 and 1990, more striking among earners (whose Gini coefficient 
fell from 0.50 to 0.41) than among persons ranked by per capita 
family income (where the decline was from 0.52 to 0.46--see Table 
3) Among earners, the relative income of the top to the bottom 
decile fell from 28.6 fold to 18.8 fold. The distribution among 
earners is of interest because it reflects directly the way the 
economy determines the incomes of factor owners, while the 
distribution among persons (a variant of the distribution among 
families) is of ultimate concern since it is most revealing of the 
welfare distribution in the society. Inequality bottomed out in 
1990 (our data refer to March) after which it has increased 
sharply, especially that among earners (where the Gini coefficient 
rose from 0.41 to 0.47), also among persons (Gini 
up from 0.47 to 0.51). Earner inequality thus returned to the 1980 
level (with the top decile to bottom decile ratio back up to 27.3), 
but remained below that of 1976, while inequality among persons now 
exceeded that of 1980 and was close to the 1976 level, reflected in 
a Gini coefficient of 0.52. In each case the largest deterioration 
was that between 1990 and 1991. Among earners the 1990-93 period 
saw significant declines in the income share of the first six 
deciles (30.8% to 27.4%), while the only major gainer was the top 
decile (36.2% to 40.4%--see Table 4a). In percentage terms the 
biggest losers were the lowest deciles the first saw its share fall 
by 23% from 1.93% to 1.48%, about the level of the late 1970s.1° 
Though the smoothness of the trends might disappear were all 
of the years to be included in the series. 
Since it is universally the case that capital incomes are 
less fully reported than labour incomes, we presume that our 
estimates of inequality understate the actual levels, probably by 
a few percentage points in the Gini coefficients (See Altimir, 
1987, for a discussion). Our assumption and hope is that this and 
other sources of errors in the estimates will not have changed much 
over time; in one respect where we feel this assumption might not 
hold--related to the introduction of the "salario integral" around 
1990--we have undertaken some sensitivity analysis to verify that 
it does not explain much of the observed increase in inequality 
since 1990. Another possible bias could result from failure to take 
account of differences in the cost of living index relevant to 
different income classes. 
Figures on the structure of income by job categories 
presented by Lopez (1994, 265) are consistent with these figures, 
in that they suggest an increase in inequality between 1988 and 
1992, one which seems to occur within each major category, from 
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Among persons, all deciles lost except the top one, whose share 
jumped from 37.3% to 42.5%, to nearly recover the 1976 level (Table 
4b). Percentage share losses at the bottom were less than in the 
earner distribution, with the first decile losing 17%, from 1.75% 
to 1.45%. Most of the bottom deciles still had a slightly higher 
share than in 1976, as reflected in the marginally lower Gini than 
in that year. 
Other authors have reported quite different trends in urban 
inequality from those presented here. Thus the series reproduced as 
Col (3) of Table 3 shows a pattern virtually the opposite of that 
reflected in the conceptually similar Col (1), in that the Gini 
coefficient rises through 1989, after which it falls, especially in 
1992 (whose observation does however correspond to a different 
month (June) than that for the other years (September) Although, 
other things being equal, one would attribute greater meaning to 
the series covering the wider population base (those of Col.3 refer 
to the urban areas as a whole), for a variety of methodological 
reasons we doubt the validity of these estimates and hence 
disregard them in the discussion which follows.'2 
It is interesting that the trends in level of concentration of 
each of the major components of personal income parallel those of 
total income (Table 5). Note also that business income has become 
more important over time at the expense of labour income.13 Since 
the latter is the most equally distributed of the components 
distinguished here, its falling share of total income probably 
contributes an upward push to the overall level of inequality. 
(Business income is in the middle with respect to the Gini 
coefficient while "other" income, which includes rental income, 
interest income, dividends, pensions, and other transfers) is the 
most concentrated of the three. Business income is most important 
in the lowest and the highest deciles, while labour income is 
paid workers to the self-employed to the employers. Although we do 
not present a distribution for 1988 the inequality trends suggest 
a considerably lower level in that year than in 1992. 
Another source, presumably drawing on the estimates using 
this methodology, reports a decline in the urban Gini from 0.47 in 
1988 to 0.44 in 1992 (Banco de la Republica, 1994). 
12 The differences in methodologies between our estimates and 
those shown in Col.(3) of Table 3, explained in the appendix, 
probably explain an important part of the difference in results. 
13 Taking the figures literally, the same could be said of 
"other" income, but as noted earlier, this may be due to a change 
in reporting procedures. Since it seems safe to assume that some of 
the reported increase is due to those changes, it would appear that 
the business component has had a continuous upward trend. 
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predominant in the middle of the distribution (Table 6). At lower 
levels of the distribution, however, business income probably 
reflects income from informal activities, and to the extent that 
these activities use very little capital, it is mostly labour-based 
income and its level is likely to be heavily influenced by the 
outcomes of the labour market. More generally, the very similar 
time patterns of the distributions of labour and of business 
incomes suggest close links between the markets in which the two 
types of income are determined. 
With respect to the reversal of the former positive trend in 
the level of inequality, the increase in the Gini of labour incomes 
was occurred mainly between 1990 and 1991 (March of each year), 
while the concentration of business incomes, though also rising 
most sharply between 1990 and 1991, continued up over the next two 
years as well. Thus the overall worsening since 1991 has come from 
the distribution of business income; in 1993 its effect was offset 
by a decrease in concentration of "other" income. 
Unfortunately, Colombia does not have systematic national 
household surveys allowing the sort of analysis just carried out 
for urban areas to be undertaken at the national level. Rural data 
available for 1988 and 1992, suggest little change in inequality 
between those two years (the respective Gini coefficients being 
0.46 and 0.45). But a serious cause for concern is the evidence 
that while urban incomes rose by 18% between 1990 and 1993, rural 
incomes fell by at least 5% over this period (Lora and Herrera, 
1994a). It would be natural to interpret such an outcome as due in 
part to the production problems of the agricultural sector in 1992 
and in part to the price impact of the apertura. Together with the 
sharply increasing inequality in the urban areas and the constant 
level in rural areas (at least over 1988—92), this widening gap 
between the two distributions would suggest an even larger increase 
in inequality at the national level than for the urban areas; it 
also suggests that, depending on where the poverty line is drawn, 
the percent of population in poverty was probably increasing over 
the early 19905.14 
14 Urrutia (1993) estimates that the national poverty incidence 
rose sharply in 1992 to reach 19%, up from 15.4% in 1991 and 18.7% 
in 1988. 
Another attempt to measure trends in distribution and poverty 
at the national level, that of Fresneda (1994, Cuadro 5), reports 
estimated Gini coefficients of 0.481 for 1978 and 0.472 for 1992 
(distribution of households ranked by per capita household income); 
a significant increase in income shares for the bottom three 
deciles (e.g. 4.2% to 5.4% for the bottom quintile) was offset by 
the increasing share of the top decile. At the same time he reports 
that according to the income measure of poverty, the share of 
people in that state fell only from 56.3 in 1978 to 53.5% in 1992 
(and from 23.3 to 20.5% for the extreme poverty line), though 
according to the unsatisfied basic needs criterion the share fell 
from 70.5% in 1973 to 45.6% in 1985 and to 32.2% in 1993. In 
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5. Developments in The Labour Market 
A number of significant changes which have taken place in 
Colombian labour markets since the late 1970s are part of the 
backdrop to the pre and post-1990 evolution of income distribution. 
Possibly the most important are: (i) a sharp increase in female 
participation rates; (ii) increasing levels of education in the 
labour force, especially among women; (iii) a marked equalization 
of incomes between men and women, partly as a result of changes in 
levels of education; (iv) a re-allocation of labour, again 
especially female labour, from low to higher paying occupations; 
and (v) towards the late 1980s and early 1990s, a change in hiring 
practices (more temporary work), and the introduction of important 
labour market reforms. Taken together, they have no doubt had a 
variety of effects on income distribution, with the net impact hard 
to predict. 
One of the most important developments was the increase in 
female participation rates - one of the largest in Latin America. 
In Bogota, for example, the participation rate of women over 12 
years rose from around 37% in 1976 to 51% in 1992 (Table 7), with 
the increase especially important in the age range 20-50 years, and 
among women with secondary and university education. The rate for 
men also increased until the mid 1980s, although much less sharply, 
and decreased afterwards. 
Since the mid 1950s the accumulation of human capital, in the 
form of significant improvements in the level of education, has 
proceeded rapidly, with particularly large increases among women in 
general and among members of the labour force. As expected, this 
process generated an important decrease in the returns to invest- 
ment in education from about 15.6% and 21% for wage-earning men and 
women respectively in 1976 to 11.3% and 13.9% in 1989's; most of 
the decrease occurred between 1976 and 1984, especially in the case 
of men whose rates during the late 1980s remained more or less 
connection with the former Fresneda distinguishes three factors 
affecting the trend in poverty incidence: an increase in average 
per capita income of 18.1% which reduced the poverty incidence by 
7.2 percentage points, the small improvement in (current price) 
distribution which lowered it by 0.4 points, and an increase in the 
relative price of the bundle of goods purchased by the poor, which 
raised it by 4 points. The latter two figures imply that the 
distribution of purchasing power (income deflated by the price 
increase of a given income groups market basket) worsened a little 
over this period. 
Although Fresneda does not present comparable figures for 
intervening years, if we assume that his figures, like others, show 
an improvement over the late 1970s and early 1980s, they are 
consistent with a sharp increase in inequality in the early l990s 
for the country as a whole. 
These figures refer to the average earnings advantage from 
having one more year of education. 
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stable, while those of women continued to decline, but at a slower 
pace than in the first part of the period. This decline was more 
important at the primary and secondary levels than at the univer- 
sity level (see Table 8 and Tenjo 1993, Table 3); from around 1990 
the relative incomes of university graduates tended to rise 
moderately for males and more markedly for females. 
Together with the accelerated increase in female education 
there was an important narrowing of the gender income gap. In 1976 
the average hourly wage of men was 30% higher than that of women. 
By 1992 the differential had dropped to zero (Table 9). In terms of 
monthly labour income the differential decreased from 62% to around 
30% in the same period. Most of the decline in the differential 
(about two thirds of it) occurred in the seventies and early 1980s, 
with a levelling off towards the latter part of the decade, and 
possibly a new smaller decline in the early 1990s. The declining 
earnings differentials during the early 1980s appear to have 
contributed to the decrease in the level of income inequality 
during those years in the three cities studied here. 
Overall labour market outcomes reflected the macroeconomic 
trends of the post-1980 period. Urban unemployment jumped in the 
early 1980s recession to reach nearly 15% in 1985/86, and the share 
of paid workers, (excluding domestics) in employment fell by about 
2% (Lopez, 1993b, 16). But real earnings of paid workers rose by 
10% over 1980-84, while those of the self employed fell by about 
18%, a combination of outcomes which Lopez interprets as a result 
of a slowing of the rate of inflation. All groups lost in real 
income over June 1984 to June 1992, though the timing of their 
losses was different. 
Labour Flexibility and Labour Market Reform 
The flexibility of Colombia's labour market was a matter of 
discussion in the l970s and 1980s. Some trends pointed to 
decreasing flexibility, though others suggested the opposite. Thus 
unionization in large scale manufacturing had declined from over 
60% in the niid-1960s to just 27% in the second half of the 1980s—— 
Ocampo, 1994, 163). Job instability, always high in rural areas, 
seems to have increased in urban areas since around the end of the 
1970s (LOpez, 1994, 2). In this respect the labour market became 
more flexible, first in fact and then in law (with the reforms of 
1990). From about 5-6% of urban employment in 1976-78, temporary 
jobs rose to and levelled off at about 13-14% in the late 1980s 
(Fedesarrollo, 1992, 34). By 1991—92 the share was on the rise 
again, reaching a seven city average of 19.5% in June-Sept 1992 and 
averaging 20.8% for males and 21.6% for females in Bogota over 
1990—92. 
Since at least the mid or late 1980s there has been an import- 
ant debate on the need to reform labour legislation and labour 
practices. Some of the views expressed during that debate were 
incorporated in legislation passed in the early 1990s, which 
unequivocally eliminated the major legal restrictions on labour 
mobility. Among the most important reforms were: 
(i) introduction of the so called Salario Integral (SI) in order to 
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reduce uncertainty in the estimation of labour costs, and simplify- 
ing the administration of payrolls. 
(ii) changes in the severance payment regime (Cesantlas). Previ- 
ously employers were supposed to create a reserve equivalent to one 
month of salary for each year of work, based on the last salary 
received by the worker; thus every time the wage/salary of a worker 
changed (usually upwards) the whole reserve had to be re—estimated. 
Further, only the nominal value of earlier withdrawals by the 
worker from this account were deducted. An annual interest of 12% 
was paid on the amount owed at date of retirement (Ocampo, 1987). 
The essence of reform consisted in removing the requirement of re- 
adjusting the fund every time the salary changed, in exchange for 
paying competitive interest rates. 
(iii) changes removing some job protection and facilitating the use 
of part—time and temporary workers. Some observers have argued that 
changes in the interpretations of the law and the attitude of 
employers were more important than the actual changes in the legis- 
lation in this area. 
As Lopez (1993a, 45) has argued, the previous system of 
severance payments and firing constraints favoured excessive labour 
rotation initially and made it prohibitive to fire after 10 years. 
With the reform new workers will operate under the new rules, but 
the workers hired before this date remain under the old system, 
slightly modified to make it easier to fire after 10 years but with 
payment of a higher indemnity. He attributes the traditional 
pattern of the worker's life cycle substantially to the legisla- 
tion: youth move into paid jobs, rotate fairly fast and are then 
constrained to dedicate the last part of their careers to the 
management of micro—enterprises (Londoño, 1987). Paid workers are 
77% of the 20-24 age group; this share falls rather smoothly to 
under 30% for those 60 and over (LOpez, 1993a, 43), with the age 
profile of the self-employed showing the opposite pattern. 
How may the introduction of the Salario Integral have affected 
labour market outcomes and the distribution of income? Workers 
under SI generally receive more money per month than under the 
previous system, but do not get fringe benefits. Since the 
household surveys we are working with estimate only current monthly 
payments (they do not question workers about their accrued but 
unpaid fringe benefits) the switch to SI will lead to an increase 
in some workers' reported monthly income, but not (or not in the 
same degree) in their true income. If earners for whom fringe 
benefits are important fall disproportionately near the top of the 
income distribution, the introduction of SI will cause an increase 
in the reported Gini coefficient, thus creating an apparent (but 
not real) worsening of the distribution of income. If fringe 
benefits are most important for low income workers the opposite 
effect would hold. 
The evidence from the 3 cities (Bogota, Medellin and Barran- 
quilla) is inconclusive as to whether the introduction of SI had a 
significant spurious effect on measured inequality or not. 
Suggesting that it might have are the facts that: (i) the Gini 
coefficients show a considerable increase in 1991, just after the 
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law of 'Salario Integral' was passed at the end of 1990 (Table 3); 
(ii) the increase in average income between March 1990 and March 
1991 was about 33%, much higher that the average of 26.3% per year 
for the period 1989-92-- that increase was higher for the upper 
deciles (the 9th and 10th deciles had an increase of over 40%). On 
the other hand, although labour income shows the same patterns just 
described, what dominated the movements both in total monthly 
income and in its concentration was the business component. The 
largest component of the increase in income in 1991, both at the 
average level and by deciles, is business income (Table 10), and 
the largest Gini increase was for business income. Thus, though the 
hypothesis that the observed increase inequality in 1991 was a 
spurious result of the introduction of Salario Integral is 
plausible, other factors were clearly at play and one must 
tentatively conclude that any role it may have had was relatively 
minor. 
Increases in Part—Time and Temporary Work 
The share of workers in our three cities employed in temporary 
jobs (defined as those who are called to work sporadically, working 
only in certain times or periods) increased sharply in 1991, as did 
the share of working less than 40 hours per week. The evidence 
suggests that such changes affected mostly the bottom deciles of 
the distribution of income. 
Note first that the number of hours work per week for the 
bottom two deciles of the income earners distribution declined 
continuously since 1990, while the figure for the rest of the 
deciles was constant, although with minor fluctuations (Table 11). 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that the changes in the 
labour legislation facilitated the use of part-time work at low 
paying levels, but that higher paying occupations were not affected 
by the legislative changes in an important manner. The reduction in 
the number of hours is particularly interesting because it happened 
during a period of relatively low unemployment. Second, there is a 
clear increase in the overall proportion of workers with temporary 
jobs after 1990 (Table 12), probably reflecting the changes in 
labour legislation mentioned above. Again, the lowest half of the 
distribution presents the highest increases while no significant 
changes are observed in the two top deciles, consistent with the 
hypothesis that the institutional changes of the late 1980$ and 
early 1990s which facilitated the use of temporary work affected 
primarily the lower and middle ranks of the distribution of income. 
A significant increase in the prevalence of temporary work occurred 
in all job categories, and was greater for independent workers than 
for paid workers and more for employees in micro—enterprises than 
for those in medium and large establishments (Lopez, 1993a, 45), 
which would seem to suggest that it was more a matter of changes in 
the market conditions than of the legislation. 
The proportion of earners working part time (less than 40 
hours a week), after fluctuating without clear trend between 1976 
and 1990, moved up sharply in the next two years as the reforms 
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were taking effect, but then fell back again in 1993 (Table 13). 
Both the level and the volatility of this variable are especially 
high in the bottom two deciles of earners. Though part time work 
was of some significance for other groups as well, its effects are 
concentrated among the lower—income workers. An important part of 
the increase in part-time work over 1990-92 probably involved an 
increase in involuntary underemployment as indicated by the 
increase in the proportion of part—time workers wanting to work 
more hours (see Table 13). This is particularly evident in the 
lowest three deciles, where in 1992 about 40% of the part-time 
workers expressed their desired to work more hours per week. 
The above, together with the fact that the average monthly 
income at the bottom of the distribution fell relative to other 
levels (and in absolute real terms) probably indicates that the 
wellbeing of the poorest component of the population was negatively 
affected by the changes in labour legislation. Note, however, that 
for both males and (especially) females most part-time work is by 
preference, and the time patterns of this "voluntary" component and 
the "non-voluntary" one are quite similar (Lopez, 1993a, 47). LOpez 
(1992), using data from DANE'S household surveys of June 1990 and 
1992, concludes that the reform increased employment instability 
(rate of job separation) for older workers while reducing it for 
the newer workers. While there is no organized information on the 
prevalence of fixed term contracts, job contracts and work on 
commission, there are indications of rapid increases in the 
frequency of each (Lopez, 1993a, 40). 
The Early 1990s and the Labour Market Effects of the Reforms 
The liberalization and modernization undertaken since 
1990 appear not to have created major short—run problems in the 
labour market, notwithstanding modest dismissals from the public 
sector. There is no evidence of a negative trend in unemployment 
rates over the longer run and the process of liberalization which 
began in the early 1990s has coincided with declining unemployment. 
Though rapid economic growth has not returned, the predicted costs 
in terms of open unemployment (e.g. RaTnlrez, 1991) of the opening 
have thus far not emerged, though as of the early 1990s open 
unemployment in Bogota was, as usual, high for youth of 16-20 
years-—19% for males and 27% for females. Female unemployment was 
relatively high for much of the prime working age range also, only 
falling below 10% for women over about 35 years. 
Between June 1988 and June 1992, the employment structure 
moved in ways normally associated with growth and modernization. 
Paid workers as a share of employment rose from 61.3% to 62.9% 
(data for 10 urban centres), with the increase concentrated in the 
medium and large (11 workers and up) private firms (29.9 to 33%) 
while the government share fell from 10.3 to 9.3% and the micro- 
enterprise share from 21.1 to 20.6 (LOpez, l993a, 33). The main 
decrease was in "other employment"--domestics and family workers. 
Self—employed non—professionals fell while employers rose, both in 
microenterprise (5.6% to 6.2%) and medium/large. 
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The interesting question now is what will happen in the medium and 
longer run. The serious problems which will continue to 
characterize and be played out in the labour market will be more 
ones of employment quality, stability and enhancement of skills 
than of quantity Se. The demand side will have to adjust 
further to the gender and educational changes on the supply side. 
The key question is how these changes in labour market functioning, 
related to the changes in legislation and in goods markets, etc. 
show up in family incomes, poverty, and family instability of 
income and welfare. Though the rate of temporary employment has 
risen, the increasing share of employees in medium and larger 
establishments is likely to represent a gain in terms of stability. 
6. Closing Comments 
It goes without saying that one cannot at this time 
demonstrate unequivocally what the labour market impacts of the 
package of reforms undertaken in Colombia have been, and even less 
identify the impact of specific reforms like the "apertura" and the 
changes in labour legislation. Concerns that high unemployment 
might result have clearly not proved warranted, and were probably 
based on an underestimate of the flexibility of the Colombian 
labour market. There are, however, real grounds for concern in the 
significant rise in urban inequality and the probably even sharper 
increase at the national level since 1990. This, together with the 
now well established fact that reform packages broadly similar to 
Colombia's have coincided with dramatic increases in inequality in 
other Latin countries, makes it essential both that the recent 
trends be better understood and that appropriate counter measures 
be taken. The levelling off of inequality in 1993 hopefully signals 
that the upward trend has come to an end, though it will be 
imperative to extend the series used here as soon as possible to 
ascertain whether that is indeed the case. 
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY OF THE ESTIMATES OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
The figures on which we base the analysis of this paper 
estimated using DANE's household surveys for Bogota, Medellin and 
Barranquilla corresponding to the month of March. 
Income was defined as the sum of labour (including the 
estimated value of payment in kind when available), business and 
"other" income. In the case of labour income the figures were 
converted to a monthly basis by multiplying by 1, 2, 3, or 4.286 
according to whether the respondent indicated that payment took 
place monthly, every two weeks, every 10 days, or every week 
respectively. In the case of daily payment the conversion to a 
monthly basis was done by multiplying the daily earnings by an 
estimate of the number of days worked in the month derived as the 
reported weekly hours worked divided by 8 and multiplied by the 
number of weeks per month (4.286). This approach is different from 
that adopted by other studies which convert daily into monthly 
payments by multiplying by an estimate of the number of working 
days in the month (30, 25, or some other figure). Note that the 
different periodicity of income reporting is likely to introduce 
two types of error in estimates of inequality. First, it overstates 
inequality among those with short reporting periods; whereas among 
daily workers there is likely to be some averaging out across the 
weeks of the month (and year) in amount of work, the procedure used 
here "assumes" that anyone who worked many hours in the week of the 
survey did so every week of the month and anyone who worked very 
little also did so every week of the month. Second, it understates 
the average difference in monthly income between those with 
permanent jobs and those without, since some of the latter will go 
through some weeks in which they do not earn at all. 
A possibly major source of distortion that we tried to correct 
was the truncation in the reporting of incomes produced by the fact 
that the questionnaires of the household surveys allow only for a 
maximum of six—figure incomes. Incomes of one million pesos or more 
are represented by the figure 999998. This distorts the income of 
the higher percentiles of the distribution and results in both an 
underestimate of the Gini coefficient at each point of time and (a 
bigger problem for the analysis of changes in distribution over 
time) an increasing underestimate over time as the number of "high 
income" earners whose incomes are excluded rises quickly in a 
growing, inflationary economy like Colombia's. The correction 
includes the following steps: (1) It was assumed that the 
distribution of each income item has a log-normal distribution. (2) 
The mean and standard deviation of the log-normal distribution was 
estimated using the non—zero values in the sample below $999,998. 
(3) The conditional mean for values 999,998 or higher were 
estimated. The conditional mean is given by the unconditional mean 
plus the standard unconditional standard deviation times the 
inverse Mill's ratio defined at the point of truncation. (4) 
Finally the conditional mean was replaced for the truncated values. 
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The "trimming" of the sample (exclusion of the highest and 
lowest 200 observations) in an attempt to deal with this truncation 
problem is not, in our judgement, a proper procedure. Unlike the 
other studies of inequality which we have seen, we did not 
undertake such a trimining. Though for some purposes this procedure 
may make sense, it is clearly dangerous when the subject of 
analysis is income concentration, since the excluded values at the 
upper end could account for a significant share of total income. 
Domestic servants and other non—relatives of the household 
head were excluded from the estimation of the distribution of 
household income per capita. However, they were included in the 
distribution of earners' income. 
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Import taxes as a Share 
Table 1 















































Import Taxes over 
Merchandise Imports 
14 . 9 
14 . 8 
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14 . 5 







13 . 3 
a) preliminary 
b) includes nonfactor services. 
Sources: Columns 1 and 2 are from Interamerican Development Bank, 1994, 




Exports and Imports in Relation to GDP. Colombia 1980-1993 
Source: National accounts of Colombia. 
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Constant 1975 Prices 
GDP Exports Imports Exports 
/ GDP 
Current Prices 
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1976 0.520 0.500 0.496 
1978 0.483 
1980 0.492 0.464 0.46 0.461 
1983 0.46 0.459 
1984 0.475 0.442 




1989 0.470 0.421 0.50 
1990 0.459 0.413 0.49 
1991 0.483 0.451 0.48 
1992 0.494 0.468 0.45c 
1993 0.507 0.467 
a. Bogota, Medellin and Barranquilla. 
b. The data refer to the major urban centres of Colombia plus a few 
smaller centres. 
c. Refers to June; methodology not comparable to that for earlier 
observations (communication from L. Sarmiento) 
Sources: Columns 1 and 2 are calculations by the authors using DANE 
household surveys for March of each year. Income has been corrected for 
truncation problems (see appendix on methodology). Column 3 is from 
Sarmiento, 1993, p 73. Column 4 is from Reyes, 1987, p 81. 
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Table 4B 
Decile Distribution of Income Among Persons 
Ranked by Total Family Income Per Capita, 1976-1993 (March) 
Bogota, Medellin and Barranquilla 
Decile 1976 1980 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 1.40% 1.49% 1.57% 1.76% 1.75% 1.73% 1.55% 1.45% 
2 2.46% 2.74% 2.83% 2.97% 2.99% 2.80% 2.70% 2.62% 
3 3.25% 3.65% 3.73% 3.86% 3.94% 3.67% 3.62% 3.45% 
4 4.11% 4.51% 4.68% 4.74% 4.88% 4.51% 4.46% 4.27% 
5 5.03% 5.42% 5.77% 5.78% 6.01% 5.62% 5.43% 5.25% 
6 6.20% 6.56% 7.03% 6.94% 7.20% 6.81% 6.61% 6.44% 
7 7.84% 8.30% 8.68% 8.56% 8.99% 8.40% 8.22% 7.97% 
8 10.46% 10.88% 11.25% 11.06% 11.21% 10.81% 10.77% 10.47% 
9 16.01% 16.06% 15.98% 15.64% 15.70% 15.66% 15.47% 15.55% 
10 43.24% 40.40% 38.48% 38.68% 37.33% 40.00% 41.17% 42.53% 
top 5% 30.58% 28.07% 26.38% 26.77% 23.34% 28.20% 29.44% 29.73% 
top 1% 12.87% 11.29% 10.06% 10.28% 7.31% 10.67% 11.68% 11.22% 
Cmi 0.520 0.492 0.475 0.470 0.459 0.483 0.494 0.507 
Decile 
Table 4A 
Distribution Among Income Earners, 1976-1993 (March) 
Bogota, Medellin and Barranquilla 
DECILE 1976 1980 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 1.51% 1.49% 1.51% 1.79% 1.93% 1.68% 1.48% 1.48% 
2 3.05% 3.58% 3.66% 3.94% 3.97% 3.53% 3.23% 3.42% 
3 3.61% 4.69% 4.83% 5.38% 5.56% 4.96% 4.71% 4.87% 
4 4.36% 4.97% 5.34% 5.73% 5.89% 5.24% 5.18% 5.06% 
5 5.31% 5.64% 5.98% 6.22% 6.30% 5.82% 5.62% 5.49% 
6 6.25% 6.62% 7.06% 7.01% 7.12% 6.56% 6.47% 6.31% 
7 8.00% 8.02% 8.67% 8.27% 8.41% 8.02% 7.77% 7.82% 
8 10.00% 10.11% 10.68% 10.40% 10.42% 10.17% 10.27% 10.28% 
9 14.76% 14.49% 15.02% 14.73% 14.22% 15.27% 14.96% 14.74% 
10 43.15% 40.40% 37.27% 36.52% 36.19% 38.76% 40.32% 40.43% 
top 5% 30.58% 28.42% 25.85% 25.50% 24.70% 27.00% 28.63% 28.82% 
top 1% 12.33% 11.31% 9.86% 10.19% 9.12% 10.49% 11.94% 9.57% 
Gini 0.500 0.464 0.442 0.421 0.413 0.451 0.468 0.467 
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Table 5 
Gini Coefficients of the Distribution of Income Among Earners, 
Various Income Components, 1976-93 (March) 
Bogota Medellin and Barranquilla 
Year Labour Income Business Income Other Income TOTAL 
GINI Weight GINI Weight GINI Weight GINI 
1976 0.439 67.27% 0.577 26.13% 0.829 6.60% 0.500 
1980 0.373 63.77% 0.565 28.39% 0.841 7.84% 0.464 
1984 0.360 58.25% 0.510 27.35% 0.644 14.40% 0.442 
1989 0.341 57.20% 0.487 27.63% 0.606 15.17% 0.421 
1990 0.346 58.89% 0.466 28.74% 0.688 12.37% 0.423 
1991 0.371 56.09% 0.516 30.19% 0.63]. 13.72% 0.451 
1992 0.370 55.04% 0.533 29.47% 0.694 15.49% 0.468 
1993 0.374 54.92% 0.547 31.06% 0.651 14.00% 0.467 
Notes: The Gini coefficients for total income, labour income and business 
income are in each case calculated for that group of indivualis receving the 
type of income in quesiton and on the basis only of that type of income. Thus 
a person with labour income and other income would appear in the labour 
income distribution as having only his/her labour income." Note that the 
surveys do not collect both labour and business income for anyone, i.e. it 
excludes this possible income combination from consideration and thus it 
leaves an unknown amount of income unreported. 
Source: DANE household surveys. 
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Table 6 
Coniposition of Earner's Incoitle by Deciles 
I) LABOUR INCOME SHARE 
Decile 1976 1980 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 48.24% 39.02% 26.37% 30.19% 30.79% 37.59% 24.38% 23.90% 
2 71.07% 63.61% 52.66% 48.63% 46.43% 38.58% 44.07% 48.01% 
3 84.48% 86.31% 67.16% 52.25% 51.81% 55.01% 61.33% 64.74% 
4 79.37% 88.11% 82.52% 87.59% 86.89% 88.76% 84.96% 86.42% 
5 83.32% 82.20% 80.42% 79.28% 82.82% 70.57% 74.63% 77.74% 
6 78.84% 80.08% 64.92% 65.39% 62.61% 72.13% 71.57% 67.36% 
7 79.53% 79.27% 63.65% 65.69% 67.37% 65.17% 63.38% 71.46% 
8 77.09% 72.63% 70.99% 66.08% 68.61% 61.67% 67.87% 66.65% 
9 71.48% 70.63% 57.13% 56.02% 61.69% 61.45% 57.45% 53.20% 
10 55.36% 46.09% 46.20% 46.09% 47.53% 43.88% 40.47% 40.95% 
Total 67.27% 63.77% 58.25% 57.20% 58.89% 56.09% 55.04% 54.92% 
II) BUSINESS INCOME SHARE 
1 42.28% 46.10% 42.96% 34.96% 37.40% 34.81% 43.73% 48.68% 
2 25.81% 29.42% 27.90% 30.01% 35.96% 43.25% 34.34% 35.54% 
3 13.36% 10.87% 19.73% 30.91% 34.94% 27.39% 24.13% 22.52% 
4 18.55% 9.25% 11.53% 3.75% 4.99% 4.38% 5.03% 4.52% 
5 14.24% 14.33% 10.66% 11.32% 10.34% 21.54% 15.31% 15.25% 
6 19.26% 16.74% 22.22% 24.09% 25.42% 18.26% 20.97% 20.11% 
7 17.49% 16.41% 25.95% 21.39% 23.44% 22.24% 25.11% 17.63% 
8 19.02% 21.77% 15.94% 20.32% 21.73% 24.83% 20.50% 20.98% 
9 22.94% 21.36% 29.27% 29.08% 26.71% 26.59% 26.84% 31.73% 
10 34.22% 42.45% 36.39% 36.65% 38.29% 40.44% 39.76% 43.11% 
Total 26.13% 28.39% 27.35% 27.63% 28.74% 30.19% 29.47% 31.06% 
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Table 7 
Unemployment and Participation Rates 
Bogota, 1976-93 (March) 
N E N W 0 ME N TOTAL 
Year Partic Unempi Partic Unempi Partic Unempi 
1976 71.37 7.80 36.85 12.17 52.61 9.46 
1980 75.16 8.07 43.17 11.18 57.63 9.34 
1984 76.49 9.81 44.86 17.01 59.30 12.77 
1986 76.89 10.54 48.08 19.41 61.23 14.32 
1987 78.31 9.24 48.98 18.26 62.63 13.01 
1988 77.96 7.96 48.78 17.83 62.16 12.16 
1989 76.85 7.13 47.33 13.38 60.94 9.75 
1990 75.04 5.22 46.45 11.77 59.73 7.97 
1991 75.15 5.99 50.07 13.58 61.74 9.28 
1992 75.76 6.03 51.09 11.52 62.41 8.46 
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Table 8A 
Average Monthly Labour Income of Each Level of Education 
as a Proportion of Complete Primary Monthly Income, 1976-93 
Bogota, Medellin and Barranquilla 
Education 1976 
Level 
1980 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
M E N 
Table 8B 
Hourly Labour Income by Levels of Education as a 
Percentage of Hourly Labour Income of Primary Education, 1976-93 
Bogota, NedellIn and Barranquilla 
M E N 
No educat 74.7% 82.6% 79.7% 81.1% 82.1% 86.6% 76.0% 84.5% 
Compl Prim 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Compl Sec 225.9% 168.8% 151.0% 133.2% 132.7% 129.6% 124.1% 123.1% 
Compi Univ 586.7% 465.7% 391.4% 367.9% 381.1% 379.7% 376.0% 384.1% 
Average 159.7% 148.8% 143.1% 140.3% 141.7% 148.9% 143.3% 140.6% WOMEN 
No educat 95.0% 83.3% 89.1% 80.7% 89.0% 87.5% 82.6% 86.7% 
Compl Prim 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Compi Sec 200.4% 157.1% 154.9% 145.4% 146.5% 154.2% 149.5% 146.1% 
Coinpi Univ 355.9% 311.4% 294.6% 301.4% 295.7% 332.4% 343.4% 358.5% 
Average 135.6% 127.8% 133.2% 139.7% 140.7% 150.2% 154.1% 155.1% 
No educat 73.4% 73.5% 74.5% 81.8% 90.1% 83.8% 83.0% 84.0% 
Compi Prim 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Compi Sec 244.3% 187.7% 166.4% 139.0% 137.5% 139.7% 138.3% 125.5% 
Compi Univ 638.7% 513.0% 436.3% 399.6% 414.4% 431.9% 429.5% 411.0% 
Average 169.3% 159.7% 152.2% 146.2% 149.9% 161.0% 157.6% 146.6% WOMEN 
No educat 84.9% 84.9% 83.8% 73.9% 85.3% 88.0% 82.7% 96.0% 
Compi Prim 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Coinpi Sec 239.4% 190.9% 188.7% 168.3% 169.7% 166.5% 158.5% 169.6% 
Compl Univ 485.1% 381.2% 401.9% 361.5% 358.8% 408.5% 392.2% 402.5% 
Average 152.9% 144.1% 157.0% 157.4% 159.2% 166.9% 168.4% 171.7% 
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AVERAGE HOURLY 
No educ 1.17 
Colnp Prim 1.48 
Comp Sec 1.38 
Corn Univ 1.73 
Average 
Table 9 
Ratio of Men's To Women's Income,1976-93 





















1991 1992 1993 
1.32 1.28 1.50 
1.45 1.60 1.38 
1.23 1.33 1.28 
1.51 1.54 1.54 



















































& LABOUR) BY EDUCATIONAL LEVELS 
1.03 1.10 1.04 1.09 1.15 
1.38 1.23 1.30 1.37 1.24 
1.35 1.05 1.02 1.30 1.07 
1.35 1.36 1.33 1.36 1.45 
1.33 1.19 1.19 1.26 1.18 1.59 
AVERAGE MONTHLY 
No ethic 1.08 
Comp Prim 1.38 
Comp Sec 1.55 







































































The growth rates in the table are geometric rates (difference in natural 
logarithms). For the estimation the rates of labour income only those 
receiving labour income were included. Similarly in the estimation of the 




Annual Rates of Growth of Idividuals' Monthly Income 
Bogota, Medellin, and Barraquilla 
76—80 80—84 84—89 89—90 
24.92% 21.78% 22.52% 28.99% 
29.29% 22.06% 20.57% 21.83% 
31.83% 22.20% 21.27% 24.52% 
28.56% 23.25% 20.52% 23.99% 
26.77% 22.96% 19.89% 22.51% 
26.77% 23.07% 18.95% 22.73% 
25.38% 23.40% 18.15% 22.92% 
25.59% 22.84% 18.58% 21.34% 
24.85% 22.38% 18.68% 17.81% 
23.66% 19.45% 18.69% 20.40% 





































INCOME (Only labour income earners) 
25.81% 22.11% 30.29% 
29.11% 22.22% 24.50% 
32.13% 22.45% 21.91% 
28.52% 23.34% 22.14% 
27.06% 22.85% 24.95% 
26.51% 23.23% 25.50% 
25.38% 23.36% 28.18% 
25.18% 23.20% 31.28% 
24.30% 22.89% 38.90% 
22.60% 20.35% 32.27% 




















































































































Average Number of Weekly Hours of Work 
Bogota, Medellin, and Barranquilla 
AVERAGE HOURS WORKED IN THE WEEK BEFORE THE SURVEY 
Decile 1976 1980 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 42.99 37.15 35.67 36.80 38.13 36.12 33.58 36.72 
2 47.41 46.79 46.15 46.67 44.29 45.30 43.70 46.23 
3 49.14 49.38 49.21 49.71 48.18 47.68 49.12 50.04 
4 50.59 50.09 47.40 49.20 46.92 49.46 49.09 49.13 
5 51.84 49.10 49.54 49.52 48.47 49.01 48.94 49.53 
6 50.00 50.00 49.59 50.64 48.81 49.42 50.67 50.36 
7 49.09 48.70 48.74 50.68 50.58 49.84 50.75 50.68 
8 47.58 48.89 48.44 50.10 49.13 49.21 49.50 49.87 
9 48.00 47.87 48.41 50.31 47.95 48.84 49.33 49.91 
10 48.03 48.06 47.62 49.29 48.20 47.65 48.91 49.39 
Total 48.51 47.70 47.36 48.68 47.34 47.55 47.79 48.46 
AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS NORMALLY WORKED 
Decile 1976 1980 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 44.04 38.41 36.76 37.53 39.62 36.77 34.03 37.13 
2 47.85 47.50 47.12 47.29 45.53 45.54 43.85 46.64 
3 49.47 49.42 49.85 50.09 49.57 47.63 49.28 50.18 
4 50.91 50.29 48.16 49.32 48.80 49.56 48.97 49.14 
5 52.10 49.46 50.39 49.63 50.10 48.97 49.04 49.79 
6 50.05 50.18 50.34 50.88 50.65 49.27 50.52 50.48 
7 49.36 49.04 49.56 50.88 52.03 49.89 50.69 50.73 
8 47.67 49.06 49.30 50.28 50.90 48.94 49.58 49.80 
9 47.87 47.94 49.16 50.30 49.69 48.69 49.15 49.91 
10 47.99 47.95 49.09 49.25 49.92 47.71 48.70 49.25 
Total 48.77 48.01 48.25 48.91 48.96 47.58 47.80 48.57 
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Table 12 
Proportion of People with Temprary Jobs 
Bogota, Medellin, and Barranquilla 
DECILE 1976 1980 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 36.85% 33.55% 41.13% 34.22% 29.80% 38.67% 35.06% 29.65% 
2 22.05% 24.36% 29.99% 22.87% 20.83% 22.81% 27.29% 21.39% 
3 17.25% 11.84% 20.79% 20.58% 14.34% 19.01% 24.88% 18.15% 
4 14.54% 9.01% 16.51% 19.88% 16.67% 21.08% 23.00% 19.83% 
5 14.21% 10.04% 16.07% 17.30% 14.44% 15.24% 19.14% 14.77% 
6 10.25% 12.37% 12.72% 12.28% 9.25% 17.23% 15.09% 14.37% 
7 10.17% 8.58% 11.46% 10.65% 7.21% 10.83% 14.81% 10.42% 
8 8.61% 7.29% 9.30% 8.92% 8.00% 9.03% 10.28% 9.05% 
9 8.13% 5.95% 7.98% 6.65% 6.27% 6.86% 7.64% 6.88% 
10 4.01% 4.04% 5.33% 4.78% 3.97% 5.08% 4.69% 4.58% 
AVRAGE 14.61% 12.70% 17.13% 15.81% 13.08% 16.58% 18.19% 14.91% 
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Table 13 
Proportion of Persons working Part Time 






































































12 . 26% 
11. 67% 
17.98% 
PROPORTION OF PEOPLE WORKING LESS THAN 40 HOURS 
DECILE 1976 1993 
1 33.58% 52.32% 
2 15.64% 26.69% 
3 6.94% 12.07% 
4 6.38% 4.41% 
5 6.49% 5.94% 
6 7.02% 7.75% 
7 7.37% 8.05% 
8 11.19% 9.91% 
9 10.02% 9.53% 
10 8.58% 7.90% 
AVRAGE 11.32% 14.46% 
PROPORTION OF PERSONS WORKING LESS THAN 40 HOURS WHO WANT 
TO WORK MORE 
DECILE 1976 1980 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1 46.57% 35.75% 41.26% 35.91% 31.06% 38.93% 40.73% 33.40% 
2 49.64% 47.06% 36.29% 27.49% 26.37% 37.83% 40.45% 31.51% 
3 48.39% 38.71% 33.93% 27.47% 17.14% 32.17% 38.54% 24.09% 
4 42.11% 36.36% 39.13% 33.33% 28.95% 21.43% 30.12% 26.92% 
5 51.72% 35.29% 35.56% 25.00% 20.00% 29.07% 32.14% 26.39% 
6 36.51% 34.83% 27.65% 20.00% 22.08% 27.84% 27.59% 23.60% 
7 34.85% 28.74% 22.29% 18.68% 13.64% 32.32% 22.14% 22.11% 
8 30.00% 29.41% 25.46% 12.50% 12.87% 13.76% 29.61% 11.30% 
9 27.78% 22.11% 15.91% 13.76% 7.00% 15.00% 21.43% 12.04% 
10 16.88% 19.15% 11.80% 8.15% 6.74% 16.00% 15.13% 7.53% 
AVRAGE 38.44% 32.74% 28.93% 22.23% 18.59% 26.43% 29.79% 21.89% 
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